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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Cross Appeal
Judge Stoker’s decision regarding the issue of the sheriff’s sale of Mike Jones v. Jeremy
Sligar and Overtime Garage, LLC; Twin Falls County Case No. CV42-16-1554 (the “Sligar
Lawsuit”), can be summarized as follows: (1) levy and execution upon litigation is not, per se, a
violation of Idaho Law; (2) the amount bid, $2,500.00, for the Sligar Lawsuit was grossly
inadequate; (3) the fact the Sligar Lawsuit is unliquidated and the fact there is some evidence of
collusion between Counsel for Safaris and Sligar creates sufficient slight additional circumstances
justifying the setting aside of the sheriff’s sale.
Judge Stoker made the following statements at the hearing on this matter:
I’m ruling that there’s nothing wrong with having levied upon this litigation.
...
[T]he sale has got to represent some reasonable relation between the value of
the bid and the value of the property. I don’t think it’s necessarily limited to
real property, though I recognize the cases in Idaho have addressed that issue
are involving real estate. I don’t see that it makes any difference.
...
But I will find, pursuant to that case, yeah, that there is a gross inadequacy
and quote/unquote additional circumstances, and the additional circumstances
is just the whole nature of this case.
...
Well, the additional circumstances is the nature of this case, that it is an
unliquidated litigation, and though I’m finding that you can levy upon and
sell that, that creates a whole issue here of what’s the right amount to bid? Do
you bid 10,000, 50,000, 125,000? I mean, it’s the nature of – the argument
that the defendcant is making her is that that’s the whole problem with
unlitigated claims is you don’t know what they’re really worth, like real
estate. And I think that is the set of additional circumstances that
differentiates this case from, perhaps, others.
...
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MR. GADD: . . .
I apologize for repeating, but it’s the gross inadequacy of consideration and
the fact that there’s an unliquidated cause of action, that’s the additional
circumstances?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. LARSEN: He also made reference to potential conflict in
[Respondent/Cross Appellant] owning [the Sligar Lawsuit] and the ability to
reach a fair resolution.
THE COURT: That’s the third thing. And I’m not casting aspersions on your
law firm. Please understand that. That’s not what I’m saying at all. I think
it’s inherent, you walk out and settle this case for 122,000 bucks, that the
whole problem here. Maybe that’s what it’s worth. I don’t know.
Tr. Vol. II, p. 39-40, L25, 1-2; p. 40, L13-18; p. 43, L19-22; p. 44, L.6-16; p. 45, L2-15.
ARGUMENT
A. JUDGE STOKER PROPERLY SET ASIDE THE SHERIFF’S SALE OF THE SLIGAR
LAWSUIT BECAUSE THE PURCHASE PRICE WAS GROSSLY INADEQUATE AND SLIGHT
ADDITIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST JUSTIFYING SETTING ASIDE THE SALE.
Judge Stoker properly perceived the issue before him as discretionary. He acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and he acted consistently with the applicable legal standards. He also
reached his decision by an exercise of reason.
Respondent/Cross Appellant acknowledges Judge Stoker properly perceived his decision as
discretionary. Moreover, Judge Stoker identified the same legal standard that Respondent/Cross
Appellant identify in its briefing. Tr. Vol. II, P. 40, L3 – P.41, L9; P.43, L19-22; P44, L6-P45, L16.
The standard for setting aside a sheriff’s sale is (1) gross inadequacy of consideration and (2) very
slight additional circumstances. Fed. Land Bank of Spokane v. Curts, 45 Idaho 414, 262 P. 877, 880
(1927); Gaskill v. Neal, 77 Idaho 428 (1956). Respondent/Cross Appellant argue Judge Stoker failed
to act consistently with applicable legal standards and failed to exercise reason.
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What

Respondent/Cross Appeallant is really asking is for this Court to reevaluate the facts and second
guess Judge Stoker’s opinion.
1.
Judge Stoker Did Not Have to Find a Specific Value of the Sligar Lawsuit to Find
The Bid Was Grossly Inadequate.
Judge Stoker had before him substantial, uncontroverted evidence that the value of the Sligar
Lawsuit was significantly more than the bid submitted by Respondent/Cross Appellant. Judge
Stoker took Judicial Notice of an affidavit filed in the Sligar Lawsuit, wherein Mike Jones testified
the value of the Sligar Lawsuit was substantial. Jones testified he invested in excess of $700,000.00
into the company that is being dissolved and he testified his valuation of the present assets of the
company exceeded $2,000,000.00. Tr. Vol. II, P.5, 4-20; R. 84 – 85. Judge Stoker asked counsel for
Respondent/Cross Appellant, “Well, Mr. Gadd, the real issue here is, I mean, can you make a
cognizable argument that $2,500 against what appears to be a many hundred thousand dollar
potential lawsuit is reasonable under that case that Mr. Larsen cited?” Tr. Vol. II, P. 20, L4-8.
Counsel dodged and reframed the question, failing to provide any evidence or argument that the
Sligar Lawsuit was not a “many hundred thousand dollar potential lawsuit.” Id. at P. 20, L9 – P. 21,
L18.
While Judge Stoker did not find a specific value for the Sligar Litigation, the only evidence
he had before him suggesting its true value was the testimony of Mr. Jones, which put that value in
the neighborhood of $2,000,000.00. Respondent/Cross Appellant produced no evidence, other than
the evidence of its own bid to purchase the Sligar Lawsuit, to controvert Mr. Jones’ valuation of the
asset. Respondent/Cross Appellant argues the bid it submitted is an indication of the asset’s fair
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market value. This argument ignores reality. Although the Sheriff is the seller, he is only selling at
the request of the judgment creditor. Thus, the judgment creditor’s purchase, at about 2% of the full
judgment amount, is not an arm’s length transaction, but is much more akin to selling the asset to
himself. Under such circumstances, it is not an adequate measure of fair market value.
The evidence before Judge Stoker suggested the bid of $2,500.00 was equal to approximately
.125% of the value of the Sligar Lawsuit. By comparison, in Gaskill, the facts were that if the
sheriff’s sale stood, “appellant has paid only $426.12 for $11,000.00 worth of property. This is
grossly inadequate consideration.” Gaskill, 77 Idaho at 432, 293 P.2d at 960.
No evidence was offered to contradict Jones’ testimony of the value of the asset. Based on
these facts, Judge Stoker reasonably concluded the bid was grossly inadequate compared to the
approximate value of the lawsuit.
2.

Very Slight Additional Circumstances Exist in this Case.

Irregularities in the sale is not the only circumstance the will justify setting aside a sheriff’s
sale. Phillips v. Blazier-Henry, 153 Idaho 724, 729, 302 P.3d 349, 354 (2013). As the most recent
Idaho Supreme Court case to address the issue of when it is appropriate to set aside a sheriff’s sale,
Phillips reviewed Gibbs, Curts, Gaskill, and Suchan. Respondent/Cross Appellant would have This
Court believe that after reviewing the foregoing cases, the proper synthesis of the law on the matter
is that “very slight additional circumstances” only exists when irregularities in the sale have
occurred. The Phillips court, however, synthesized the law differently and summarized the
commonality between Curts, and Gaskill (where relief from the sale was granted) and the distinction
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from Suchan (where relief from sale was denied) as follows, “The foregoing cases had one additional
fact in common – they were all cases in which the party injured by the grossly in adequate sale price
and additional circumstance was the judgment debtor.” Phillips, 154 Idaho at 729, 302 P.3d at 354.
In addition, the Phillips court concluded, “This Court has not previously held that gross inadequacy
of price, standing alone, provide grounds for setting aside a sheriff’s sale. Our decisions have
uniformly held that there must be some irregularity in the sale or other slight additional
circumstance.” Id. at 730, 302 P.3d at 355. If it was the intention of This Court to limit the grounds
on which a sheriff’s sale can be set aside to gross inadequacy and irregularities in the sale, the court
would not have included the language, “or other slight additional circumstance.”
Other slight additional circumstances exist in this case. There is no dispute that all the cases
cited by Respondent/Cross Appellant and discussed herein involve the sale of real property. Idaho
has never addressed what “slight additional circumstances” are required when considering the sale of
unliquidated litigation. Thus, this case is distinguishable from all of the Idaho authorities on the
matter. The one standard that is clear from the Phillips case, however, is that if the additional
circumstances cause harm to the judgment debtor, then they should be found to be adequate. Judge
Stoker based his decision on this standard.
Judge Stoker first stated the slight “additional circumstances is just the whole nature of this
case.” Tr. Vol. II, P. 43, L21-22. He later clarified:
Well, the additional circumstances is the nature of this case, that it is an unliquidated
litigation, and though I’m finding that you can levy upon and sell that, that creates a
whole issue here of what’s the right amount to bid? Do you bid 10,000, 50,000,
125,000? I mean, it’s the nature of – the argument that the defendant is making here
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is that that’s the whole problem with unlitigated claims is you don’t know what
they’re really worth, like real estate. And I think that is the set of additional
circumstances that differentiates this case from, perhaps, others.
...
MR. LARSEN: He also made reference to potential conflict in Safaris owning this
litigation and the ability to reach a fair resolution.
THE COURT: That’s the third thing. And I’m not casting aspersions on your law
firm. Please understand that. That’s not what I’m saying at all. I think it’s inherent,
you walk out and settle this case for 122,000 bucks, that’s the whole problem here.
Maybe that’s what it’s worth. I don’t know.
Id., P.44, L6 – P.45, L15.
Thus, Judge Stoker was acting consistently with the Phillips case in finding that other slight
additional circumstances, other than just irregularities with the sale, existed in this case. Those
circumstances were that the asset sold involved unliquidated litigation and the potential for harm to
the judgment debtor is very likely.
Although Judge Stoker did not base his decision on Idaho Code § 11-304, which requires the
Sheriff to not sell more property than can reasonably satisfy the judgment, that statutes supports a
finding that the sale of unliquidated litigation creates sufficient “slight additional circumstances.” If
there is evidence the price is grossly inadequate and the value of the asset cannot be determined, one
must ask how the Sheriff can comply with the requirements of I.C. § 11-304 and work significant
hardship upon the judgment debtor.
Sound public policy supports Judge Stoker’s reasoned decision to deny the sale of
unliquidated litigation via public auction. The potential ramifications to the court system and justice
system are astonishing. By way of example, a litigant of modest means with a judgment against
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him/her would be vastly deterred from initiating litigation against a wrongdoer. Why would the
litigant expend the time and money to litigate this matter if their judgment creditor could swoop in a
reap the awards (especially if the ultimate verdict is significantly more than the judgment)? Further,
why would an attorney take such a case (especially if being taken on a contingency fee basis)?
Likewise, a defendant could purchase the cause of action against him or her and then choose to
dismiss the matter (something that has happened and is happening in states that allow theses causes
of action to be sold). See Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208 (Utah 1999).
Allowing a judgment creditor to purchase the debtor’s litigation at a substantial discount serves a
great disservice to the public policy of Idaho, its residents, and the public’s access to courts.
In this specific case, allowing the sale to stand would work great harm to Appellant/Cross
Respondent. If this sale is allowed to stand, one of four things will happen: (1) Safari’s will litigate
the Sligar Lawsuit (using the extensive work and discovery Jones has already amassed) and secure a
substantial judgment against the defendants in that case; (2) Safari’s will settle this matter for
pennies on the dollar; (3) Safari’s will litigate the matter and fail for lack of effort or desire; or (4)
Jones will continue to litigate this matter and Safari’s will claim one hundred percent of any verdict
recovered. All of these outcomes are highly inequitable to Jones.
Assuming Respondent/Cross Appellant secures a significant judgment against the defendants
in the Sligar Lawsuit, that would be the Respondent/Cross Appellant’s judgment. Respondent/Cross
Appellant would have a continuing deficiency judgment against Jones in the amount of
approximately $120,000.00 and it would then have a judgment against the defendants in the Sligar
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Lawsuit for damages caused by the defendants to the Appellant/Cross Respondent. The conclusion
would be that Appellant/Cross Respondent would lose his claims against the defendants (and his
ability to pay the Judgment), while still owing significant amounts to Respondent/Cross Appellant.
Alternatively, if Respondent/Cross Appellant settles the matter for pennies on the dollar, the
defendants in that case maybe be getting away with bad acts with no real repercussions. Likewise,
Appellant/Cross Respondent will have no opportunity to have his day in court and be made whole
from the defendants’ alleged wrongful conduct. Moreover, he’d still owe a significant judgment to
Respondent/Cross Appellant.
In the event Respondent/Cross Appellant litigates this matter and fails, it would remain
inequitable to Appellant/ Cross Respondent because he would not have had the opportunity to pursue
the damages for wrongs he suffered at the hands of the Defendants. Finally, in the event Jones is
required to litigate this case, he will incur all the expenses, but not be allowed to recover any of the
proceeds of such efforts.
Given the dearth of law in Idaho governing the sale of unliquidated litigation and the strong
public policy reasons against allowing such a sale, how can this Court conclude that Judge Stoker did
not act consistently with applicable legal standards and did not reach his decision by an exercise of
reason?
B. APPELLANT CONSIDERS THE ORIGINAL ISSUES ON APPEAL TO BE FULLY
SUBMITTED.
The issues raised by Appellant in the opening brief are sufficiently covered in such brief and
additional briefing will not substantially add to the discussion. Appellant considers those issues fully
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submitted to the Court for its sound review.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Judge Stoker’s decision regarding the cross appeal should be
affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of December, 2017.
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP

____________________________________________
THEODORE R. LARSEN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the 13th day of December, 2017, I caused to be
served two copies the foregoing document as follows:
David W. Gadd
WORST, FITZGERALD & STOVER, PLLC
905 Shoshone Street North
Post Office Box 1428
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1428

x Via US Mail, Postage Paid
 Via Facsimile – (208) 736-9929
 Hand-Delivered - Court Folder
x Electronic mail:
dwg@magicvalleylaw.com

-_________________________________
/~/2:;;i-THEODORE R. LARSEN
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